We study a supply chain comprised of a retailer who sources a product from a manufacturer. The retailer has superior information about the market demand, and the manufacturer must build the capacity and set the wholesale price prior to observing demand realization. We explore the level of information the retailer can share with the manufacturer by means of cheap talk. We first analyze a case in which the demand distribution is discrete and show that under mild conditions, the supply chain participants can exchange information truthfully. This result stands in sharp contrast with the existing literature which shows that in a static model without behavioral concerns, such as trust, the retailer tends to manipulate the demand forecasting information; hence, information cannot be shared truthfully under a wholesale price contract. The underlying reason for this result is the fact that the manufacturer undertakes multiple actions based on the information received from the retailer; for example, she makes the operational decision of setting the capacity level as well as the marketing decision of setting the wholesale price. When sharing information, the retailer must consider the trade-off between his incentive to inflate the shared information in order to encourage the manufacturer to increase the capacity level, and to deflate the forecast information, which results in a reduced wholesale price. We demonstrate that these countervailing incentives can balance each other and lead to a truthful information exchange. We also show that information sharing can hurt the supply chain. For more general continuous demand distributions, we first find that full information sharing is not possible. We then demonstrate that by sharing sub-interval information, the supply chain partners can still reach some level of partial information exchange. Finally, we illustrate via a numerical study that as the manufacturer's capacity build-up cost increases, her profit can increase as well, since it encourages the retailer to share more information with the manufacturer.
Introduction
The estimated costs of a mismatch between supply and demand are astronomical. For example, Kurt Salmon Associates Inc. (1993) estimated this cost to be $30 billion for the grocery industry, and Troyer (1996) provided an estimate of $14 billion for the food service industry. A key initiative to lower these costs is forecast information sharing between firms in a supply chain. This initiative is reinforced by a growing stream of research that emphasizes the value of information sharing on operational effectiveness, such as improved inventory control, the alleviation of the bullwhip effect and better matching of supply with demand (for example, see Chen 1998 , Aviv and Federgruen 1998 Fisher 2000, and Lee and Whang 2000. An excellent survey of information sharing in supply chains can be found in Chen 2003) .
Although better forecast information usually improves the performance of a supply chain, when the supply chain is composed of multiple independent, profit-maximizing firms, some key obstacles exist in achieving truthful information sharing. First, each firm in a supply chain is strategically transmitting information; hence, it shares information only when it is better off sharing than concealing it. Even when information sharing achieves an efficient outcome for the supply chain, in many cases, this efficiency gain is difficult to achieve in reality due to the tension between efficiency and self-interest. This tension, which is a type of the famous prisoners' dilemma, can lead to an inefficient outcome in which no-information is shared among the firms (e.g., Gal-Or 1985 and Li 2002) .
Furthermore, the accuracy of the shared demand forecast information is often hard to verify (Ren et al. 2010) ; consequently, firms in the supply chain are prone to the opportunistic behavior of their supply chain partners. This opportunistic forecast manipulation has been observed in many industries, including telecommunications, commercial aircraft, defense systems, and automotive industries (Oh and Ozer 2011) . For instance, Solectron, a major electronics supplier, had $4.7 billion in excess component inventory because of inflated forecasts provided by its customers (Engardio 2001) . Due to this problem of non-credible information exchange, firms sometimes do not fully take the information provided by their partners into account. However, such a strategy can result in even greater losses: Cole (1997) documented how Boeing's suppliers did not believe its optimistic forecast; as a result, they were not able to fulfill Boeing's large orders in time.
In order to solve the problem of information manipulation, researchers have shown that information can be shared truthfully through complex contracting and mechanism design, such as screening and signaling, taking the conflicts of interest and information into account Lariviere 2001 and Ozer and Wei 2006) . Despite this conclusion, empirical evidence suggests that in many cases firms still choose to contract using the simple wholesale price (Arrow 1985 , Desai and Srinivasan 1995 , Bajari and Tadelis 2001 , Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003 , Cohen et al. 2003 . Furthermore, information appears to be shared via informal talk rather than complex contracts, as Farrell and Rabin (1996) write:
"We suspect, most information sharing is not done through Spence style signaling, through the price system, nor through carefully crafted Hurwicz-style incentive-compatible mechanisms: it is done through ordinary, informal talk." The aforementioned findings and claims then raise an interesting question: Is it possible for the firms in a supply chain to truthfully share information under a simple contract, such as a wholesale price contract, via informal talk? Some researchers in supply chain management attempted to answer this question.
For example, Ren et al. (2010) demonstrate that demand forecast information can be transmitted from a retailer to his manufacturer due to repeated interaction and a long-term relationship. In addition, Ozer et al. (2011) reveal that information can be shared truthfully under a wholesale price contract via informal talk due to trust and trust-worthiness between firms in a supply chain.
Our paper adds to these recent attempts to explain the ability of firms to truthfully share information in a supply chain under the widely-used wholesale price contract via informal talk. The key contribution of our paper is four-fold: first, we demonstrate that even in a static environment without a long-term relationship and behavioral reasons, firms in a supply chain can fully and truthfully share forecast information via informal talk under a wholesale price contract, if we incorporate firms' pricing decisions after information sharing. Second, we demonstrate that, surprisingly, information sharing between firms, that is often believed to be beneficial in improving supply chain efficiency, can actually hurt the supply chain. Third, in certain cases, information is partially shared, and more information can be shared as the value of the information increases. Lastly, we demonstrate that the supplier's profit can increase as her unit capacity build-up cost increases due to increased amount of shared information.
We develop a static model in which a downstream retailer (he) is endowed with superior demand information since he is closer to the consumer market, and this information can be shared with the upstream manufacturer (she). In anticipation of the selling season, the manufacturer must secure capacity in addition to establishing the wholesale price. The retailer then sets the retail price and sells to the consumer market faced with the manufacturer's capacity constraint. The retailer's forecast information can be shared with the manufacturer at any time, which, in turn, affects the manufacturer's decisions regarding both capacity and the wholesale price.
In the existing research literature, information transmission often occurs, if ever, after the wholesale price is determined, but before the capacity decision has been made (cf. Lariviere 2001 andÖzer and Wei 2006) . In this case, the retailer has an incentive to inflate his forecast to encourage the manufacturer to build larger capacity. We also illustrate that if the retailer shares his information after the capacity is committed but before the wholesale price has been set, the retailer deflates his forecast to induce the manufacturer to set a lower wholesale price. In summary, after the manufacturer commits to either the wholesale price or the capacity, the retailer has an incentive to manipulate his forecast information; hence, the retailer's information cannot be truthfully shared. However, if the manufacturer sets both the wholesale price and the capacity after information is shared, the dynamics changes drastically; we indeed demonstrate that the forecast information can be truthfully shared in this scenario.
If the retailer truthfully shares his forecast information with the manufacturer before the manufacturer makes both the operational decision of securing the capacity level and the marketing decision of setting the product's wholesale price, this shared information influences both decisions. The fact that the manufacturer takes these multiple actions after the shared information introduces countervailing incentives for the retailer's manipulation of the information: the retailer faces a trade-off between inflating his forecast in order to induce the manufacturer to build larger capacity and deflating the forecast to encourage the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price. In some cases, these incentives counterbalance each other, and the retailer chooses to share information truthfully. Specifically, we
show that the strategic retailer may truthfully transmit his forecast information to the manufacturer if the demand information is drawn from a discrete distribution.
Literature Review
Our work is related to three streams of research: the first approach studies the value of information in supply chains; the second line of research analyzes mechanisms that result in truthful information sharing under settings of asymmetric information when the firms make decisions strategically; the third line of research explores the ability of firms in a supply chain to exchange information using cheap talk.
The value of information in a setting with symmetric information:
The merits of information sharing between the different parties in a supply chain are well known (Lee and Whang 2000) and have received considerable attention in the Operations Management literature. Aviv (2003 Aviv ( ),Özer (2003 and Toktay and Wein (2001) study the problem of sharing forecast information in non-strategic settings. This stream of research usually adopts the perspective of a single decision maker who optimizes the performance of the supply chain. A general conclusion drawn from this research is that information benefits the supply chain. However, our setting differs from these models in at least one major dimension; we allow the firms to make decisions strategically, and the retailer can choose whether to share information truthfully or to manipulate the shared information. Moreover, our conclusions are also relevant to the analysis of the value of information in supply chains as well; we demonstrate that in certain situations, unexpectedly, the value of information sharing is negative, i.e., the supply chain becomes worse-off when information is shared.
Incentives for information sharing under settings of asymmetric information:
Despite the many benefits of information sharing among supply chain partners, researchers are also interested in answering the following question: What are the incentives of the firms in a supply chain to share information in a truthful manner, when each firm attempts to maximize its own profit rather than the performance of the supply chain as a whole? Cohen et al. (2003) , for example, provide several cases of overly optimistic forecasts that were provided by a manufacturer to its supplier in several industries; they empirically demonstrate that the manufacturer orders 30 percent less than the shared forecast information on average. In addition to this empirical evidence, Özer and Wei (2006) show that the popular simple wholesale price contract results in forecast manipulation, and consequently, no information can be shared.
As a result of the problem of information manipulation, researchers suggest the use of sophisticated contracts in order to align the firms' incentives to truthful information sharing. For example, the uninformed firm offers a menu of contracts to induce the informed firm to reveal its private information by choosing a specific contract from this well-designed menu of contracts, i.e., a screening model (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) . In the screening literature, Ha (2001) provides a model in which the supplier does not know the buyer's marginal cost in a news vendor-type setting. Porteus and Whang (1999) develop a model in which a supplier and a buyer have an opportunity to enter a long-term supply relationship.
The buyer knows whether the market for his new product is large or small, but the supplier can only estimate this condition. They characterize the optimal screening contract form from the supplier's perspective.
Another way to overcome the problem of information manipulation that has been suggested in the literature is the use of signaling. In this setting, the firm with the superior information in the supply chain takes an action first, which conveys information to the uninformed party. In this literature, Cachon and Lariviere (2001) study a signaling game, in which the manufacturer moves first by offering a commitment contract to the supplier. They demonstrate that this contract enables the manufacturer to reveal his private information truthfully and that, consequently, the supplier builds her capacity based on this information. Özer and Wei (2006) extend the model of Cachon and Lariviere (2001) ; in addition to the signaling case, they analyze a screening contract that also results in truthful information sharing.
Information sharing using informal communication (cheap talk):
Despite the recommendations of researchers to develop sophisticated contracts to ensure a credible information exchange, in reality, the information is often also shared via informal communication (cheap talk). Furthermore, in spite of the weaknesses inherent in the simple wholesale price contract in achieving the credible information exchange highlighted by researchers, this contract is still widely used (Bajari and Tadelis 2001 and Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003) . In an attempt to reconcile this apparent contradiction between the research suggestions and the industry practice, two approaches have emerged so far: reputation building through repeated interaction and a trust-based model.
First, Ren et al. (2010) study information sharing in repeated interactions between a retailer and his supplier and emphasize the effect of a long-term relationship on the level of information sharing.
They demonstrate how the prospects of future profits obtained from truthful information sharing can outweigh the incentive of a retailer to inflate his demand forecast during the current period, resulting in the alignment of his incentives to truth-telling. They conclude that using a review policy of the retailer's forecast in addition to the actual demand can result in an efficient outcome for the supply chain: the retailer truthfully shares his forecast, and the supplier builds capacity based on this forecast under a simple wholesale price contract.
Second,Özer et al. (2011) develop a trust-embedded model to provide an alternative explanation for the use of the wholesale price contract. In their work, trust and "trustworthiness" play a critical role in information sharing in environments where cheap talk is uninformative. The role of trust has two important components: (i) a new Bayesian updating mechanism that assumes individuals do not trust each other when sharing information; (ii) the disutility from false report which measures "trustworthiness."
In addition, they observe that repeated interactions reinforces the role of trust and trustworthiness in forecast information sharing.
By providing another explanation to the phenomena of sharing information under the simple wholesale price contract, our work complements the two aforementioned cited studies. We develop a model with different sequence of event, and show that information can be shared if the manufacturer takes multiple actions based on the shared information, specifically, if we make the pricing decisions after information sharing.
Our work also contributes to the emerging research on the use of cheap-talk in operations management. This recent research has primarily focused on the strategic communication between a firm and its customers about the firm's current status information, such as the congestion or availability information (Allon et al. 2011 , Allon and Bassamboo 2011a and 2011b . In contrast, our work analyzes the ability of informal communication to share demand forecast information in a relationship between a retailer and his manufacturer within a supply chain.
In the seminar work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , they show that cheap talk can be informative, if the incentives of the two parties are not too far apart. One of the key points of our paper is: under which circumstances are the incentives of the supply chain members aligned so that information can be shared truthfully? We completely characterize the conditions in which cheap talk can be informative, and explain the reason in the paper. Moreover, in the case of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , there is a one dimensional action taken by the receiver, whereas in our model, the incentives of the retailer and manufacturer are close to one another due to multiple dimensional actions on the manufacturer's (receiver) side before information sharing. Indeed, if we study one dimensional action space, i.e., either the capacity or the wholesale price decision alone before information sharing, the incentives of the retailer and the manufacturer are very different, and hence information cannot be shared.
This paper is also related to the literature on vertical information sharing in a supply chain. Focusing on a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple competing retailers, most papers in this stream of research explore the incentives of retailers to share their information with the manufacturer (Li 2002 , Li and Zhang 2002 . Li and Zhang (2008) study the confidentiality issue of information sharing, and Shin and Tunca (2010) discuss the use of auctions to achieve information sharing. Ha and Tong (2008) and Ha et al. (2011) explore information sharing in two competing supply chains. Furthermore, Shang et al. (2011) analyze the information sharing issue in a supply chain comprised of one common retailer and two competing manufacturers. Focusing on a supply chain with one manufacturer selling through two competing retailers, Anand and Goyal (2009) show that the retailer with superior demand information does not share its information with the manufacturer under a wholesale price contract due to the possibility of information leakage. However, Kong et al. (2011) demonstrate that information can be shared vertically without leakage under a revenue-sharing contract. One extension of our work is to consider competition and to analyze the impact of competition on information sharing in supply chains.
The Model
Consider a supply chain with a retailer (he) who sources a product from a manufacturer (she). The retailer sells the product in the consumer market, where the consumer demand function is
We assume that θ ∈ Θ is the unknown market potential, drawn from a distribution with cdf F 0 (·) and the corresponding pdf f 0 (·).
In preparation for the selling season based on her belief, the manufacturer must secure capacity K at a cost of c 0 per unit capacity and determine the unit wholesale price w. After observing the manufacturer's capacity K and the wholesale price w, the retailer subsequently sets the retail price p.
Finally, the consumer demand D is realized, and the manufacturer produces to satisfy the demand up to her capacity level K. The cost of production is c per unit.
Since the retailer is closer to the consumer market, he can observe the realization of θ prior to the beginning of the selling season. Upon observing θ, the retailer decides whether or not to share this information with the manufacturer by sending a message m ∈ F about the realization of θ, where F is the measurable set of feasible messages. Denote the retailer's message report strategy as σ(θ); that is, the message m of the retailer with forecast information θ is σ(θ). The shared information between the retailer and the manufacturer is not verifiable or contractible; consequently, the retailer is free to choose a message m that may differ from the observed θ, i.e., he can lie. This information transmission belongs to cheap-talk in the economics literature; the shared information is neither verifiable nor directly affects the payoff of the sender (the retailer) and the receiver (the manufacturer).
At the same time, the manufacturer also establishes her belief system, a probability measure µ m with the associated conditional pdf f m (·) and the cdf F m (·) about the realization of θ, which depends on the retailer's message m. The manufacturer's belief is a probability measure of θ conditional on the retailer's reported message m. Denote the uncertainty set of the manufacturer's belief µ m as U (µ m ),
i.e., based on the retailer's reported message m, the manufacturer's belief of θ takes arbitrary values in U (µ m ). We assume that the manufacturer is rational, and takes all the available information in her decision-making into account.
In summary, the sequence of events is as follows: 1) The retailer observes θ; 2) the retailer sends the message m to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer establishes her belief system µ about the true value of θ based on the message m; 3) the manufacturer subsequently builds capacity K and determines the wholesale price w; 4) The retailer decides the retail price p; 5) Demand is realized and the manufacturer produces to satisfy demand up to her capacity level K.
Note that given the observed θ, the manufacturer's capacity K, and the wholesale price w, the retailer's profit can be expressed as
Let p * (K, w, θ) ∈ arg max p π R (p | K, w, θ) be the retailer's optimal pricing decision. Then, the manu-facturer's profit given the retailer's optimal price is
We consider two scenarios for the manufacturer: first, the manufacturer maximizes the expected profit based on her belief of the true θ upon receiving the retailer's message m, i.e., max K, w 
; second, the manufacturer maximizes her profit for the worst case outcome, i.e., she is a max-min optimizer:
and w * (m) as the corresponding optimizers for the manufacturer's capacity and the wholesale price.
We consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, which is formally defined in the following way:
(4) the manufacturer's belief µ m is consistent, i.e., the associated pdf of the probability measure µ m is
, where 1 {·} is an indicator function.
The above definition requires that neither the manufacturer nor the retailer has a unilateral profitable deviation from the strategy profiles that determine the equilibrium. In particular, condition (1) implies that for a given capacity and wholesale price, the retailer chooses the retail price that maximizes his profit. Condition (2) states that for a given message m, the manufacturer determines her capacity level and wholesale price to maximize either the expected profit (N ) or the worst case profit (A). Condition (3) implies that the retailer sends a message to maximize his profit taking the manufacturer's strategies K * and w * as given, i.e., the retailer strategically transmits his information to the manufacturer.
Condition (4) means that the manufacturer's belief is self-confirming; she updates her belief using Bayes' rule given the retailer's equilibrium reporting strategy σ * .
In this paper, we are particularly interested in evaluating the level of information sharing. We specifically ask the question whether the retailer has an incentive to share his information truthfully for all possible demand realizations. An equilibrium in which information is shared perfectly and truthfully is called a perfectly informative equilibrium, and we define it as follows:
Definition 2 A perfectly informative equilibrium is an equilibrium (as defined in definition 1) in which
In a perfectly informative equilibrium, the retailer finds it in his best interest to always send a message that reveals his observed market condition, and the manufacturer uses this information when determining her capacity and wholesale price.
Benchmark Solution: Full Information
Before we move on to the analysis of information transmission, we first investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer knows the retailer's demand information. This establishes a benchmark and enables us to investigate the firms' incentives in subsequent sections. 1
Lemma 1 and the retailer's profit is
This lemma states that if information is shared perfectly and truthfully, the manufacturer builds her capacity and makes the pricing decision such that all the capacity would be used, and there would be no shortages in the market. The intuition behind this result is straightforward; if the manufacturer knows the market condition, investing in over-capacity results in out of pocket costs, and under-investment in capacity results in lost sales, which immediately translates into loss since p > w > c + c 0 in equilibrium.
Consequently, the manufacturer builds the capacity that will exactly match the demand.
While the manufacturer would maximize her own profit, the resulting wholesale price and capacity decisions may not maximize the supply chain surplus. In the following lemma, we consider the setting in which the wholesale price w ∈ (c + c 0 , θ) is set exogenously, while the manufacturer sets the capacity and the retailer sets the price and orders the product.
Lemma 2 When the manufacturer knows the realization of θ and the wholesale price
is set exogenously, the manufacturer chooses K = ; the supply chain surplus is a decreasing function of the wholesale price w.
Lemma 2 illustrates that a lower wholesale price is preferred from the supply chain's point of view, since it mitigates the double marginalization effect. Nevertheless, as the manufacturer maximizes her own profit, the wholesale price would be set too high from the supply chain's point of view. This conflict creates an interesting interaction between the two parties on whether or not information should be shared.
Two-point Distribution Case
In order to illustrate the key intuitions, we first consider the case in which the demand forecast is drawn
To study the retailer's incentives to transmit his private forecast information strategically, we first explore the case in which forecast information is shared after both the wholesale price and the retail price are determined, followed by the case in which forecast information is shared after the capacity level has been determined.
We then consider the case in which the manufacturer's capacity and wholesale price decisions as well as the retailer's retail price decision have been made after information sharing.
Information sharing after the prices have been set: First, consider the case in which the manufacturer's wholesale price w and the retailer's retail price p are fixed. 2 After information transmission, the manufacturer sets her capacity level K, and then retailer sells up to this capacity level. Given that the wholesale price is fixed, the retailer prefers the largest manufacturer capacity possible. 3 Suppose that the manufacturer believes the retailer's message and builds up her capacity based on the transmitted information; that is, the manufacturer increases her capacity level as the retailer increases his message of the market potential. Knowing this manufacturer's response, the retailer has an incentive to inflate his forecast as much as possible, regardless of his forecast information. Understanding the retailer's incentive to inflate his forecast, i.e., the reported message is independent of the retailer's private information, the manufacturer does not believe the retailer's message, and information cannot be shared. Indeed,Özer et al. (2011) formally prove this observation: The only equilibrium in this case is uninformative. 4 Consequently, if the wholesale price is fixed in advance, for example, due to competition or long-term contracts, the retailer's forecast information cannot be shared by means of cheap-talk. Specifically, the downstream firms' forecast inflation has been most pervasive in industries such as electronics, semiconductors and commercial aircraft (Cohen et al. 2003 (Cohen et al. , andÖzer et al. 2011 .
Information sharing after the capacity has been set: Second, suppose that the manufacturer's capacity level K is now fixed. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price w after following information sharing, and the retailer subsequently determines the consumer price p and sells up to the fixed manufacturer's capacity level, i.e., the sales quantity S = min(θ − p, K). The retailer's optimal profit becomes max p π R = (p − w) S, which strictly decreases in the wholesale price w under the optimal price p. As a result, the retailer prefers that the manufacturer set the wholesale price as low as possible.
Suppose that the manufacturer believes the retailer's message and determines the wholesale price based on the retailer's transmitted information. Intuitively, the manufacturer sets the higher wholesale price when the market condition is good, i.e., under larger market potential θ. Recognizing this manufacturer's behavior, the retailer then deflates his forecast information as low as possible, independent of his private information, to induce the manufacturer to set the lower wholesale price. However, knowing this retailer's incentive, the manufacturer does not believe the retailer's message to be truthful; hence, no information can be shared between the retailer and the manufacturer.
In summary, if we consider only single dimensional action for the manufacturer, either a capacity decision or a pricing decision, the retailer's forecast information cannot be shared truthfully; if the manufacturer believes him, the retailer tends to inflate his forecast facing the manufacturer's subsequent capacity decision, whereas he is inclined to deflate facing the manufacturer's subsequent pricing decision.
These observations engender an interesting research question: What happens to the retailer's incentive if the manufacturer sets both the capacity level and the wholesale price based on the shared information?
Information sharing before the capacity and the prices have been set: We now consider both the manufacturer's wholesale price decision and her capacity decision after the information sharing stage. When the retailer transmits his forecast information to the manufacturer, he faces trade-off. For example, consider the retailer with his forecast information θ H , and suppose that the manufacturer believes the retailer's transmitted information. To study the retailer's incentive to lie, we consider what happens if the retailer lies, i.e., reports θ L . After receiving the retailer's transmitted information θ L , the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price, which benefits the retailer. On the other hand, the manufacturer accumulates a smaller capacity, and this small capacity becomes a binding constraint for the retailer's pricing p, which hurts the retailer. The question is then whether these benefits and costs can balance each other enough to incentivize the retailer to report truthfully: 
, where the parameter ν is a proxy for the uncertainty level in the market. Note that a similar metric is also utilized in Anand and Goyal (2009) as a proxy for demand uncertainty. 6
This proposition then implies that the retailer has an incentive to share his information if the level of uncertainty in the market becomes higher, i.e., ν ≥ 3. To understand the intuition, consider an extreme case in which θ L < c + c 0 < θ H . In this case, no production occurs for θ L and a transaction occurs for θ H under the full information case. As a result, in this case, both types of retailers, both θ H and θ L , have an incentive to truthfully share the forecast information with the manufacturer. First, if the retailer with θ L forecast information lies to the manufacturer and the manufacturer believes him, then she will set the wholesale price to be greater than the cost c + c 0 > θ L . Consequently, the retailer with θ L forecast information does not gain any benefit by misleading the manufacturer; hence, he has an incentive to truthfully share his information. Second, if the retailer of θ H type lies to the manufacturer, i.e., reports that θ = θ L , and the manufacturer believes him, she will not build up any capacity, i.e., K * =0, since θ L < c + c 0 . As a result, the retailer's profit becomes zero under lying. In contrast, if he shares his forecast information truthfully, he will earn strictly positive profit, which then provides a retailer with θ H information, an incentive to truthfully transmit his information. Similar arguments hold when θ L > c + c 0 and ν is large enough. Therefore, when the level of market uncertainty measured by ν is large, both types of retailers have an incentive to share the forecast information truthfully.
Note that this proposition answers our first research question: Is it possible for the retailer to truthfully transmit his forecast information to the manufacturer under a simple wholesale pricing contract without trust and long-term relationship? If we consider pricing decisions in addition to the capacity decision after information sharing, the retailer's forecast information can be shared truthfully. In particular, if the market uncertainty is high, the retailer's information can be shared in equilibrium under the simple wholesale price contract. Note that retailer's information can be also truthfully shared using complex contracts and mechanisms, such as screening and signaling. However, this proposition limits the value of those complex mechanisms compared to the simple wholesale pricing; that is, if the information becomes more valuable, it can be shared via informal talk even under simple wholesale pricing.
In that sense, it implies that those complex mechanisms have relative advantage in information sharing compared to the simple wholesale pricing only when the market uncertainty is small. This implication can be one potential explanation of the reason many firms in supply chains still choose to contract using the simple wholesale price.
Interestingly, the condition for the truthful information sharing, ν ≥ 3, does not depend on the manufacturer's prior belief about the market condition. Consequently, as long as ν ≥ 3 holds, the retailer can truthfully transmit his forecast information to the manufacturer, regardless of the manufacturer's prior belief, 7 because the manufacturer perfectly interprets the retailer's message under the full informationsharing equilibrium.
As the capacity build-up cost c 0 increases, the market uncertainty ν increases; hence, it is more likely for the retailer to be able to transmit his forecast information to the manufacturer. To understand the intuition, consider the retailer with forecast θ H . As c 0 increases, θ L − (c + c 0 ) decreases, and as a result, the capacity level built by the manufacturer decreases as well. Thus, the retailer with θ H has less incentive to lie, i.e., to report θ L instead, because by lying the retailer faces stricter capacity constraints. Consequently, the higher capacity build-up cost c 0 leads to more effective forecast information sharing. Note that without pricing decisions, Özer et al. (2011) find that a lower capacity cost induces more effective forecast information sharing via laboratory experiment. Considering pricing decisions in addition to the manufacturer's capacity decision, our model predicts the opposite, which yields the following interesting testable hypothesis: When the upstream manufacturer decides both a wholesale price and capacity with the downstream retailer setting the retail price afterwards, a higher capacity build-up cost leads to more effective forecast information sharing. This hypothesis can be tested empirically, e.g., through laboratory experiment, and it would provide an interesting comparison with the opposite empirical evidence found inÖzer et al. (2011) without pricing decision.
A stream of previous research has shown the benefits of information sharing in a supply chain (e.g., Lee et al. 1997 and Whang 2000) and also explored the value of information sharing (e.g., Fisher 2000) . Having established that the retailer's forecast information can be shared under a simple wholesale price contract when the market uncertainty is high in Proposition 1, we study whether this forecast information sharing is beneficial to the supply chain. The next proposition reveals that information sharing does indeed benefit the retailer and the manufacturer; consequently, the supply chain, when the manufacturer is a max-min optimizer, which is First, because the manufacturer sets the capacity and the wholesale price as a Stackelberg leader after information transmission, her profit is always (weakly) higher if information is shared, independent of whether the manufacturer maximizes her profit under a worst case scenario or her expected profit. Table 2 . Furthermore, in a babbling equilibrium, the impact of double marginalization is less severe than that in a perfectly informative equilibrium; consequently, expected consumer surplus is also higher without information sharing (0.1251 vs. 0.2164), i.e., information sharing can also hurt the consumers.
In summary, we demonstrate that the retailer can share his forecast information truthfully with the manufacturer, before the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the capacity; specifically, when market uncertainty ν is large, the retailer can share his forecast information truthfully with the manufacturer, in equilibrium. However, the retailer cannot credibly share his forecast information with the manufacturer, after the manufacturer sets either the wholesale price or the capacity. Furthermore, interestingly, we show that both the supply chain and the consumers can be hurt by information sharing.
General Distribution Case
In Section 4, we characterized the deterministic (pure) equilibria for the two-point distribution of the retailer's forecast information. Now we generalize our model and study the case in which
is drawn from a general distribution.
Existence of a Perfectly Informative Equilibrium
We found in §4 that retailer's forecast information can be fully shared with the manufacturer and presented the precise condition under which the perfect information sharing can occur. We begin by posing the following similar question: Can the retailer and the manufacturer coordinate over a perfectlyinformative-equilibrium even for a general distribution of the retailer's forecast information? The next proposition demonstrates that for a discrete distribution case, the answer is positive; i.e., it is possible to generalize the results of §4, and under certain conditions, a perfectly informative equilibrium can emerge. We consider a discrete distribution Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ n } where there are n possible demand states and θ L = θ 1 < θ 2 < · · · < θ n = θ H with the probability of θ i being ρ i , such that ∑ n i=1 ρ i = 1.
Proposition 4 For a general discrete distribution case, perfect information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer can occur in equilibrium if and only if
Note that Proposition 4 is a generalization of Proposition 1; Proposition 1 corresponds to the case of n = 2 in Proposition 4. It states that if the market uncertainty is high enough for any two consecutive types, an informative equilibrium can emerge. The Proposition also states that as the number of possible demand states increases, i.e., as i increases, the minimum distance between two consecutive types, θ i+1 − θ i , must increase as well. 9 As a result, it becomes harder to reach a perfectly-informativeequilibrium as the number of possible demand states increases.
From this proposition, we can also infer that it is impossible to achieve full information sharing under a general continuous distribution because the necessary condition of Proposition 4 requires the difference between neighboring types should get larger. However, for a continuous distribution, such a separation between the possible types does not exist.
Corollary 1 If θ is drawn from a general continuous distribution, a perfectly informative equilibrium does not exist.
To better understand the incentives under a general continuous distribution, let us first examine the possibility of truthful information sharing when the manufacturer acts in a "naive" way that she always trusts the retailer's forecast. Under this case, if the retailer reports the forecast truthfully, the manufacturer would not build excess capacity, and the retailer does not face capacity constraint as shown in Lemma 1. Let us examine the incentives of the retailer when he chooses to either inflate or deflate the forecast. When the retailer inflates his forecast, he encourages the manufacturer to increase the capacity level but also to increase the wholesale price, as shown in Lemma 1. However, an increased capacity does not benefit the retailer because he does not face capacity constraint even when he reports truthfully. The retailer consequently becomes worse off due to the increased wholesale price; hence, he will not inflate the observed θ. In contrast, when the retailer deflates his forecast, he encourages the manufacturer to lower the wholesale price but also to build a smaller capacity. While a decreased capacity negatively impacts the retailer's profit, it is a second-order effect, because when the retailer reports truthfully, he does not face capacity constraint according to Lemma 1. The retailer gains from the reduced wholesale price, which is a first-order effect, since he receives lower price for all the units ordered from the manufacturer. Therefore, the retailer would be better off deflating the shared information if a perfect information sharing equilibrium exists for a continuous distribution.
Partial Information Sharing
Given the negative result of Corollary 1 on full information sharing, we now examine the question of whether the retailer and the manufacturer can achieve some level of information sharing even when θ is drawn from a continuous distribution. Proposition 4 suggests that the retailer only wants to deflate his forecast to some extent, but not to an extremely low level. This finding suggests that the retailer's incentive is somewhat aligned with the manufacturer's and reveals the possibility of partial-informationsharing in equilibrium. 10
In order to characterize the structural properties of the pure strategy equilibrium, let us consider all the capacity-wholesale-price pairs the manufacturer may implement. When a retailer is indifferent among multiple options with the same wholesale price, we assume that he would choose the option with the lowest capacity since this option is Pareto optimal. For the no production outcome, the capacity choice is K = 0 and the wholesale price w is c + c 0 as defined in §3.1.
Suppose that in the possible outcome space, the manufacturer may implement the following two capacity-wholesale-price pairs (K, w) and (K ′ , w ′ ). Without loss of generality, let us assume
We first show that it must be the case that K < K ′ and w ≤ w ′ .
Lemma 3 For two possible capacity-wholesale-price pairs (K, w) and (K
Lemma 3 enables us to order all the possible implementation plans according to the capacity decision.
A low capacity offer is associated with a low wholesale price, and vice versa. Next, we show that the 10 Note that similar characteristics are observed in Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
retailer with low θ type chooses low capacity and low wholesale price, and vice versa, in the deterministic equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Consider two types of retailer
Proposition 5 implies that any possible pure strategy equilibrium with finite possible outcomes must correspond to a partition on the interval [θ L , θ H ] with low retailer types choose low capacity and low wholesale price, and high retailer types choose high capacity and high wholesale price. In a partialinformation-sharing equilibrium (PIS ), the retailer does not transmit the exact value of θ, but rather reports the message m that describes a sub
with z interval is defined by z + 1 points, such that θ *
We use the notation I 0 to denote the null partition that includes only one interval, i.e., z = 1. Note that our previous definitions of the belief system and the announcement strategy hold also for the case in which m is a sub-interval of [θ L , θ H ]. Specifically, the equilibrium definition in Definition 1 also holds for the more general case in which the retailer and the manufacturer share sub-interval information rather than the exact value of θ.
The PIS equilibrium that we focus on corresponds to the partition equilibrium in Crawford and Sobel (1982) ; in a PIS equilibrium (σ * , µ, K * , w * , p * ), the reporting strategy σ * (θ) is a sub-interval of Θ, and θ ∈ σ * (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. In other words, in a PIS equilibrium, the retailer chooses to share the sub-interval containing θ truthfully, and the manufacturer takes this information into account in her capacity and pricing decisions. In order to better understand the concept of the reporting strategy of the retailer in the PIS equilibrium, we consider the following example: Assume that θ is drawn from some continuous distribution over the support [0, 1] , and in a PIS equilibrium, the partition I is defined
Then, in a PIS equilibrium, the reporting strategy of the retailer is:
Max-min manufacturer
We first characterize all the deterministic equilibria for the case of a manufacturer who maximizes her profit under the worst case scenario when θ L > c + c 0 . This condition implies that even in the worst case forecast scenario, it is optimal for the supply chain to produce and sell products to consumers.
Proposition 6 (a) All the equilibria under the max-min manufacturer have the following structure:
in equilibrium, there exists a partition with z intervals, 0 < z ≤ 1 + log 3 (
(b) Furthermore, if one equilibrium is more refined than another, i.e., has a larger z, both the manufacturer and the retailer have a (weakly) higher ex-post profits under the more refined equilibrium.
We characterize all the pure strategy PIS equilibria for the max-min manufacturer. Based on the market uncertainty, ν, the number of equilibria is (1 + log 3 ν). These equilibria can be ordered by the number of intervals; that is, an equilibrium with a larger number of intervals is more refined, and offers higher profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. The most refined equilibrium has (1+log 3 ν) intervals.
It is interesting to note the similarity of the structure of the partition in equilibrium to Proposition 4, in which we demonstrate that a perfectly informative equilibrium depends on a separation between the possible adjacent demand levels. In Proposition 6, the length of each sub-interval is the same as that needed in order to reach an informative equilibrium in the discrete case in Proposition 4. Moreover, analogous to Proposition 2, the retailer and the manufacturer are better-off when they exchange more information. Therefore, their profits are higher as the equilibrium supports a more refined partition. It is also interesting to note that the structure of the partition equilibrium for the max-min manufacturer does not depend on the prior distribution: two different prior distributions over the same support and the same cost parameters result in the same set of possible equilibria.
Another interesting point is the number of sub-intervals that can be supported in equilibrium. 
Expected-profit-maximizing manufacturer
We now turn to an analysis of the case in which the manufacturer maximizes her expected profit. Similar to the max-min manufacturer case, we can specify the structure of any pure strategy equilibrium for continuous distributions. To illustrate how to find a PIS, we present our analysis with a partition of the interval [θ L , θ H ] into two sub-intervals. We further assume in this section that production is always strictly positive. 12 Consider the set Θ to be partitioned into two sub-intervals using the breaking-point θ * . We call the sub-interval [θ L , θ * ] the lower sub-interval and denote it by I L , and refer to the interval (θ * , θ H ] as the upper subinterval and denote it by I H . In a PIS equilibrium, upon receiving the message m, the manufacturer updates her belief about the market condition in a Bayesian manner as presented in (4) in Definition 1.
If the retailer reports that θ belongs to the sub-interval I i , i ∈ {L, H}, which is characterized by the lower demand level θ i and the upper possible demand level θ i , the manufacturer's problem can be written as:
When the manufacturer receives the message m, she updates her belief about the demand distribution and uses f m (θ) as her posterior pdf. If there is ample capacity, i.e., K ≥ θ−w 2 , the manufacturer's profit is
, and if the realization of the demand is high, such that the capacity constraint is binding, the profit of the manufacturer is given by K (w i − c) . Using this fact, we can characterize the optimal capacity and wholesale price of the manufacturer in equilibrium:
Proposition 8 In a PIS equilibrium, the wholesale price and capacity level, given the message m i =
11 It is possible to have a deterministic equilibrium with an infinite number of possible outcomes as illustrated in the previous section. The structure of equilibrium is similar while the general presentation becomes cumbersome since the partition of an interval is mathematically defined for finite break points only.
12 The assumption that production is strictly positive for all demand realizations implies that the wholesale price cannot be higher than the market potential. This assumption is satisfied if ( ∫ θfm(θ)dθ + c + c0)/2 < θL. A sufficient condition is θH − θL < θL − (c + c0). Note that a similar assumption is used, e.g., in Ziv (1993), Li and Zhang (2007) and Shin and Tunca (2010) . In these cases, the authors also assume that the price is determined in such a way that production is always strictly positive. Furthermore, we relax this assumption in our numerical study using a uniform distribution.
[θ i , θ i ], i ∈ {L, H}, are characterized by the following equations:
where
Note that (6) is a variant of the critical fractile solution of the newsvendor problem. In addition, the second condition, (7), can be viewed as a weighted average of the expected marginal profit of the manufacturer with respect to the wholesale price, given ample capacity, and the marginal profit, given scarce capacity; both are measured holding the capacity constant.
In equilibrium, the retailer chooses to report the sub-interval truthfully; that is, the threshold type θ * is indifferent between the two sub-intervals by Corollary 2. Based on the existence of the threshold type, the following proposition defines the conditions for the existence of a P IS equilibrium :
Proposition 9
In a PIS equilibrium, the following set of equations hold:
(6) and (7) hold for i ∈ {L, H}.
In a PIS equilibrium, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and capacity level to maximize her expected profit, given the information received from the retailer. The partition is designed, such that a retailer observing the market condition θ * is indifferent between announcing m H and m L , where
The set of wholesale prices and the capacities is chosen, such that a retailer observing θ < θ * is better-off announcing m L truthfully. Although such a retailer might face a capacity constraint, the increased wholesale price from announcing m H offsets the gains from any increased capacity. Similarly, a retailer observing θ > θ * is better-off announcing m H truthfully since a different announcement would result in a lower wholesale price, but also lead to severe capacity constraints. 13
This proposition shows that a downstream retailer and an upstream manufacturer may be able to reach some intermediate level of information sharing even in a static model and when the state of the demand is drawn from a continuous distribution. 
Numerical study: uniform distribution case
In this section, we present a numerical example for equilibrium outcomes and the manufacturer's equilibrium expected profit under the uniform distribution of the retailer's forecast information, i.e., One might conjecture that the manufacturer's expected profit in equilibrium would decrease as the capacity build-up cost c 0 increases. This conjecture holds if we restrict our attention to the babbling equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure 2 . However, surprisingly, this conjecture does not hold for partial information sharing, via either two intervals or three intervals; that is, the manufacturer's expected profit can increase as her unit capacity-build up cost increases. For example, for c 0 ∈ [84, 89] in Figure 2 , the manufacturer's expected profit in a partial information-sharing equilibrium via two intervals increases as c 0 increases. The reason is closely related to the expected value of the information contained in a shared 13 Technically, Proposition 9 presents five equations with five unknowns, θ * ∈ [θL, θH ], KL, KH , wH , wL. So, the existence of the solution corresponds to the existence of a PIS equilibrium. We present an example with a uniform distribution in §5.2.3. message between a manufacturer and a retailer, which can be measured using entropy as depicted in Figure 3 . Given the equilibrium partial information sharing structure, the Shannon entropy is calculated
where z is the number of intervals in equilibrium, and p i is the length of each interval. Note that for c 0 ∈ [84, 85] in Figure 1 , the threshold value of θ is close to the upper bound, which implies that the amount of shard information is small, i.e., the corresponding entropy is close to zero. As c 0 increases further, the threshold value of θ decreases; and as a result, the two intervals become more evenly split. Thus, the retailer's shared forecast information becomes more informative; hence, the entropy increases as c 0 increases, which benefits the manufacturer. In terms of informativeness, the entropy is maximized when c 0 is approximately 94; in this case, the cut-off point in Figure 1 evenly splits the whole interval. This benefit of more informative shared information dominates the downside of the increased capacity build-up cost c 0 ; and hence, the manufacturer's expected profit increases as c 0 increases for c 0 ∈ [84, 89] in a partial information-sharing equilibrium. This also explains that the manufacturer's expected profit increases for the partial information sharing via three intervals.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show that forecast information can be shared truthfully within a supply chain via cheap talk under a wholesale price contract, especially when the market uncertainty is large. In our model, the manufacturer makes his pricing decision as well as his capacity decision based on the shared information. The fact that the manufacturer takes multiple actions based on the shared information brings interesting dynamics into the equilibrium analysis of the information exchange between the retailer and his manufacturer. While with a single action after information sharing, truthful information sharing cannot occur in equilibrium, the countervailing incentives the retailer faces with the multiple manu- facturer's actions after information sharing can result in truthful information exchange in equilibrium using cheap-talk.
In many operations management models, there is an underlying assumption that firms take a single action based on shared information. While it is more realistic to assume that based on some types of market information, firms make multiple decisions, one motivation in analyzing unidimensional action space is that it may approximate a multidimensional model. However, our results show that the outcome may be very different when analyzing the multidimensional case; whereas with a single action no information can be shared, with multiple actions we show that for a discrete distribution full information can be exchanged, and for the continuous case, partial information can be shared.
Our findings have several important implications. First, we provide an explanation for the prominent use of cheap-talk as a mechanism for information exchange among firms in a supply chain under simple contracts. Second, firms that wish to share information in a supply chain can plan their sequence of decisions accordingly. For example, a manufacturer can communicate to the retailer that he is bundling the operational decision and the marketing decision together in order to encourage the retailer to share information truthfully. However, if the manufacturer commits to his pricing decision before receiving the information from the retailer, no information can be shared via informal talk. We believe that introducing the effect of multiple actions on the incentives to share information can lead to future interesting research in this area. Third, our results imply that even though complicated contracting using screening and signaling can achieve truthful information sharing, the value of those contracts is limited compared to a simple contract such as wholesale pricing because information can be shared truthfully even under a simple contract via informal talk, if the market uncertainty is large.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) After the manufacturer sets the capacity K and the wholesale price w, the retailer sets the optimal retail price which can be written as p = min{ , which matches the supply precisely. Note that if the retailer faces capacity constraints, the manufacturer would increase her own profit by building up more capacity because the wholesale price w is always more than c + c 0 .
(c) The results follow directly from parts (a) and (b) given the capacity, the wholesale price, and the retail price.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Under this setting in which the wholesale price w ∈ (c + c 0 , θ) is set exogenously, the retailer sets the optimal retail price p = min{ , and the retailer's profit is
, the supply chain surplus is
, which is a decreasing function of wholesale price w when w > c + c 0 .
Proof of Proposition 1:
When θ ≤ c + c 0 , no production/transaction will happen. Indeed, given that the manufacturer would never set the wholesale price w lower than c + c 0 (which would guarantee a loss for the manufacturer), truthful information sharing can always happen under this case. Lemma 1 identifies the perfectly informative equilibrium outcome when θ > c + c 0 . Notice that under the perfectly informative equilibrium outcome, a higher θ corresponds to a higher wholesale price w and a higher capacity K. We first check the incentive of the retailer under the full information sharing when the manufacturer does not have the knowledge on θ. The lower type θ L retailer does not have any incentive to mimic the high type θ H retailer because he would face a higher wholesale price and the original capacity is sufficient. In contrast, the high type θ H would mimic the low type θ L if the discount in wholesale price outweighes the loss due to reduced capacity. For low type θ L , the manufacturer's optimal capacity level and the optimal wholesale price become
; therefore, if the type θ H retailer deviates and sends a low message θ L , the capacity is binding, and his optimal retail price is p =
Consequently, full information sharing, i.e., a perfectly informative equilibrium, is possible if ; when the retailer type is θ H , the retailer's profit is
Proof of Proposition
. When θ = θ L , the manufacturer and the retailer have the same profits under both the babbling equilibrium and the truthful information sharing equilibrium. However, when θ = θ H , the manufacturer and the retailer have lower profits under the babbling equilibrium when the truthful information sharing equilibrium is possible: First, the retailer's profit under the babbling equilibrium,
, is smaller than that under the truthful information sharing equilibrium,
, when the truthful information sharing equilibrium is possible,
Second, the manufacturer's profit under the babbling equilibrium,
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We first show that for the babbling equilibrium, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price would be among 
2 . In this case, the manufacturer's profit can be written as (w − c − c 0 )
, and correspondingly,
. The manufacturer sets the capacity and wholesale price in a fashion identical to the worst-case scenario and achieve the profit of
. From Proposition 2, both parties have (weakly) lower profits compared with the full information sharing equilibrium.
The manufacturer always fully utilizes the capacity in Case I.
Case II: Using
, we compare the manufacturer's expected profits under both w * .
, the manufacturer's expected profit is ρ H (w − c)
, the manufacturer's expected profit can be written as ρ H (w − c)
The manufacturer then picks the optimal w * that gives her the higher profit under Case II.
Hence, the manufacturer chooses the optimal wholesale price w * among the three possible strategies from Cases I and II. Each of the three strategies can be optimal. For example, when θ L is very close to c + c 0 , the third strategy, i.e., w * =
, is the optimal strategy as the loss from no production for the low type θ L is small. When θ L is sufficiently large, whether to choose the first strategy
, depends on ρ L and c 0 , i.e., the cost of leftover capacity. If c 0 is low and/or ρ H is high, the second strategy would be chosen, and if c 0 is high and/or ρ H is low, the first strategy would be chosen to ensure that the capacity is always fully utilized.
It is straightforward to obtain that the manufacturer's expected profit under the babbling equilibrium, i.e., under no information sharing, is lower under all three strategies than that under the perfectly informative equilibrium, i.e., full information sharing. That is, the manufacturer always benefits from information sharing. The retailer would also be worse off if the manufacturer focuses on or shuts the low type θ L down. When the manufacturer accommodates both types θ H and θ L in a babbling equilibrium, the high type θ H retailer would face a lower wholesale price than that under perfectly informative equilibrium, and enjoy a higher profit, whereas the low type θ L retailer would encounter a higher wholesale price and accept a lower profit compared with the full information sharing case. As a result, the re-
, which is higher than the expected profit under the full information sharing case
(of babbling over perfectly informative equilibrium) can be larger than the manufac-turer's relative expected profit loss
to no information sharing. Therefore, the babbling equilibrium may improve the supply chain surplus compared to that under the perfectly informative equilibrium. In particular, if the manufacturer accommodates both types θ H and θ L retailer in the babbling equilibrium, a higher supply chain surplus can be achieved under no information sharing even when perfectly informative equilibrium is possible,and the specific example is provided and discussed in the paper.
Proof of Lemma 3:
If K = K ′ , without loss of generality, let us assume w < w ′ . For any type θ such that θ > w, the option (K, w) strictly dominates (K ′ , w ′ ); for any type θ such that θ ≤ w, the retailer would not place an order under (K ′ , w ′ ). Therefore, if (K ′ , w ′ ) might be implemented in the equilibrium, (K ′ , w ′ ) must correspond to the no production outcome-K ′ = 0, w ′ = c + c 0 ≤ w and we reach a contradiction. Therefore, K < K ′ .
Given that K < K ′ , it must be the case that w ≤ w ′ ; otherwise, the pair (K ′ , w ′ ) would offer a strict higher profit for type θ > w ′ compared with (K, w). If (K, w) might be implemented in the equilibrium, it must be chosen by type θ ≤ w ′ and correspond to no production outcome. This implies that K = 0 and w = c + c 0 ≤ w ′ and we reach a contradiction. Therefore, we must have K < K ′ and w ≤ w ′ .
Proof of Proposition 4: It is clear that
is necessary for the existence of the truthful information sharing equilibrium due to Proposition 1.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to see this set of conditions is sufficient to ensure all the individual rationality conditions.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Given that type θ prefers (K ′ , w ′ ) over (K, w) and K < K ′ , we have w ′ < θ. Therefore, w < w ′ < θ < θ ′ .
Given the option (K, w), the relevant type θ set price at max{θ − K, 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Under any equilibrium, consider the potential wholesale price and capacity choices of the manufacturer. Because the manufacturer is extreme risk-averse, the manufacturer's optimal response for each message is to set w and K according to some θ. Let us rank all these possible θ and index them so that θ 1 < θ 2 < · · · < θ k . Because the manufacturer is extreme risk-averse, θ 1 = θ L .
Given Proposition 4 and that F has positive density on the support, at equilibrium, the boundary types must be indifferent from truthful reporting or mimicking a lower type. Therefore 
Proof of Proposition 7:
Under any equilibrium other than no production equilibrium (the babbling equilibrium), consider the potential wholesale price and capacity choices of the manufacturer. Because the manufacturer is extreme risk-averse, the manufacturer's optimal response for each message is to set w and K according to some θ. Let the maximum possible choice of θ be θ 0 . Clearly, we will have 
Proof of Proposition 8:
We can clearly find K L and w L large enough such that the optimization problem of the manufacturer can be defined over a compact set. We further define the points such that K L and w L cannot be an optimal solution (for example choose w L to be higher than θ H and choose K L such that there is ample capacity even for demand realization θ H ). Since it is a compact set, a solution to the optimization problem of the manufacturer exists, and it characterized by the first order conditions. Equations (5) and (7) are the derivatives of the objective function with respect to K L and w L . After finding the solution to (5) over the compact set, it is easy to see that even without the restriction to the compact set, the solution to (5) cannot lie outside of the compact set.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Based on the analysis of the capacity and wholesale price decisions of the manufacturer, we can express the profit of the retailer as a function of θ in the following manner:
In equilibrium, the retailer truthfully reports the interval containing the realized value of θ. When even the high level of capacity the manufacturer builds is not enough to set the unconstrained monopoly price, and the retailer is forced to increase his price compared with the unconstrained monopoly price.
We now characterize the condition to ensure that in equilibrium the retailer chooses to report the sub-interval truthfully. In order to do so, we define the following function:
The function ∆(θ) estimates the difference in the profits of a retailer between reporting m H and m L , after observing demand forecast θ. In order to have a PIS equilibrium the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) ∆(θ) < 0 for θ < θ * ; (ii) ∆(θ) > 0 for θ > θ * ; and (iii) ∆(θ * ) = 0. The conditions imply that a retailer observing that θ < θ * is better-off announcing that θ ∈ I L , and a retailer observing that θ > θ * is better-off announcing that θ ∈ I H , and a retailer observing θ * is indifferent between the two possible messages.
Note that
The function ∆(θ) is first decreasing in a linear fashion, and then for the interval θ ∈ (2K L + w L , 2K H + w H ) the function is convex, and it is finally increasing in a linear way. Also note that ∆(θ L ) < 0. At the point θ L , both capacity levels K L and K H do not pose capacity constraints for this low level of demand, and therefore the retailer's profit is influenced only by the wholesale price. Naturally, the retailer is better-off with a lower wholesale price. In an equilibrium, ∆(θ * ) = 0 which translates to:
Note that this is the condition given in Proposition 9. Finally we must ensure that θ * ∈ [θ L , θ H ] in order to obtain feasibility.
